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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
cutting retailers or to the distributors who supply them. A weapon not
needed during the fair trade era comes to the fore again.
Overruling of the Colgate doctrine has been suggested,4 and some at-
torneys think that the present Supreme Court may well overturn it.47 The
cases before and after the Colgate decision show the federal courts' hostility
to price maintenance agreements and to the various other methods used by
manufacturers to maintain suggested prices. It must be remembered also
that the Colgate case, while protecting the right to refuse to sell, carried
with it an important qualification of the right, namely, "in the absence of
any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly."4  The courts may inter-
pret this phrase so broadly as to negate the effect of the decision without
actually overruling the case. How broadly this qualification will be in-
terpreted is a matter not foreseeable at the present tune. The whole price
maintenance phase of trade regulation is one which will bear dose watching
for further developments.
EARL C. SHEEHAN
Negotiable Instnments Incomplete
When Delivered
T HE DELIVERY of negotiable instruments intentionally left incomplete
figures prominently in everyday business transactions. It is remarkable
that the practice is still so widespread in view of the background of law which
certainly tends to discourage it. Yet, for reasons of immediate conveni-
ence, unequal bargaining power, or carelessness, people do sign their names
to negotiable paper on which certain important items such as the amount,
the date of payment, or the name of the payee are left blank.
At the law merchant, if a maker or drawer delivered a negotiable in-
strument leaving blank any essential element, such as the date, the amount,
or the name of the payee, the law thereby conferred an implied authority to
fill up the blank upon anyone into whose hands the instrument lawfully
came.'
According to the general view, where a blank was left for either the
date or the amount, this implied authority at law extended no further than
to an insertion of the true date or the proper amount as determined by
salers or manufacturers for selling to price-cutting retailers, and agreements to
coerce manufacturers or wholesalers to enter fair trade contracts. 2 CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. (9th Ed.) Sec. 7076 (1951).
" Comment, Refusal to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE L. 3. 1121
(1949).
'
TInvestor's Reader, June 20, 1951, p. 4.
-"250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 Sup.Ct. 465, 468 (1919). Cf. United States v. Klearflax
Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
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authority expressly given by the signer or implied from the facts.2 But
when the instrument contained a blank for the payees name, the holder
could fill in either his own name,3 the name of Is transferee,4 or, where
the instrument was payable to order only, the name of his mdorser, regard-
less of the authority expressly or impliedly given by the signer, provided
that the holder had no actual notice of such authority.6
If a blank was not filled in accordance with the authority expressly or
impliedly given by the signer, the completed instrument was rendered in-
valid as to any persons having notice that it was not so fied.7 A holder
receiving the completed instrument without notice took free of any defense
of lack of authority which .the signer could assert against a person who
filled the blanks without authority."
With the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in effect in all 48
states,9 practically all problems arising in the United States from negotiable
1Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 How. (63 U.S.) 96 (1859); Goodman v. Simonds,
20 How. (61 U.S.) 343 (1857); Roberts v. Adams, 8 Port. (Ala.) 297 (1838);
Canon v. Grigsby, 116 M1. 151, 5 N.E. 362 (1886); Market & Fulton Nat. Bank v.
Sargent, 85 Me. 349, 27 Ad. 192 (1893); Van Etta v. Evenson, 28 Wis. 33 (1871).
Contra, Inglish v. Breneman, 9 Ark. 122 (1848).
But the authority implied from the existence of the blanks would not au-
thorize the person intrusted with the instrument to vary or alter the material terms
of the instrument by erasing what is written or printed , nor to make any addi-
tion to the terms of the note"; Angle v. North-western Mutual Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S.
330 (1875); Accord, Dumbrow v. Gelb, 72 Misc. 400, 130 N.Y.Supp. 182 (1911)
(authority to add words, "with interest," is not to be presumed.)
'Overton v. Matthews, 35 Ark. 146 (1879) (insertion of any date other than true
date avoids note as between makers and holder who inserts, but not as between
makers and purchaser for value before maturity without notice of improper inser-
tion); Bank of Houston v. Day, 145 Mo. App. 410, 122 S.W 756 (1909) (date);
Chestnut v. Chestnut, 104 Va. 539, 52 S.E. 348 (1905) (amount).
'White v. Vermont & M. R. Co., 21 How. (62 U.S.) 575 (1858) (negotiable
bonds); Schooler v. Tilden, 71 Mo. 580 (1880); Thompson v. Rathbun, 18 Ore.
202, 22 Pac. 837 (1889); Frank & Adler v. Lilienfield, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 377
(1880).
'Abram v. Greer, 88 Ad. 884 (R.I. 1913); see Simpson v. First Nat. Bank, 94 Ore.
147, 155-156, 185 Pac. 913, 916 (1919).
"First Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Johnston, 97 Ala. 655, 11 So. 690 (1892); Arm-
strong v. Harshman, 61 Ind. 52 (1878); Fretwell v. Carter, 78 S.C. 531, 59 S.E.
639 (1907).
'White v. Vermont & M. R. Co., 21 How. (62 U.S.) 575 (1858); Sittig v. Birkes-
tack, 38 Md. 158 (1873); Thompson v. Rathbun, 18 Ore. 202, 22 Pac. 837 (1889);
Close v. Fields, 2 Texas 232 (1847); see Simpson v. First Nat. Bank, 94 Ore. 147,
155-156, 185 Pac. 913, 916 (1919)
7Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 447 (1867); Goodman v. Simonds, 20
How. (61 U.S.) 343 (1857); Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & G. 147, 65 Eng. Rep. 342
(1854).
'Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22 "How. (63 U.S.) 96 (1859); Hudson v. Hanson,
75 IMI. 198 (1874); Linick v. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265, 125 N.Y. Supp.
93 (1910); Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N.Y. 531 (1860); Fullerton v. Sturges, 4
Ohio St. 529 (1855); Bank of St. Clairsville v. Smith, 5 Ohio 222 (1831)
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instruments executed with blanks are now governed by the rules found in
Section 14 of the Law.1" With certain modifications, this section attempts
to codify the rules of the law merchant.
Section 14 provides:
Where the instrument is wanting in any material particular, the per-
son in possession thereof has a prima face authority to complete it by fill-
ing up the blanks therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by
the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted
into a negotiable instrument operates as a prima facie authority to fill it
up as such for any amount.
In a suit to recover upon an instrument originally contaimng blanks,
the holder is aided by the first two sentences of Section 14, which create a
presumption that the instrument was completed within authority expressly
or impliedly given by the signer."
The prima facie authority granted to the person in possession of the
instrument by Section 14 is similar to the implied authority conferred on
a holder at the law merchant by the delivery of an instrument containing
a blank.' 2 This authority extends to any incomplete feature of the instru-
'BEuTL's BRANN'AN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTs LAW 122 (7th Ed. 1948). Al-
most all states have adopted § 14 with the identical language found in the Uniform
Law. Some states have made changes in the wording, but they appear to be of
minor importance.
'A negotiable instrument delivered incomplete as to date, but which expresses a
fixed period after date when payment is to be made, comes within the scope of § 13
which deals exclusively with undated negotiable instruments. However, § 14 is
broad enough to include such matters and most cases refer to this section when deal-
ing with such a case. Section 13 is discussed in Bank of Houston v. Day, 145 Mo.
App. 410, 417, 122 S.W 756, 758 (1909).
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code would bring some decided changes in
the present law. See § 3 -115 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, (Final Text Edi-
tion, Nov., 1951) The proposed code condenses and rewords § 14 of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, omitting the second sentence for the stated reason that it
has utility only in connection with the old practice of signing blank paper to be
filled in later as an acceptance. It eliminates the rule embodied in §§ 13 and 15
of the Negotiable Instruments Law. (Section 15 is further considered sifra at note
12).
'In 'e Gillett's Estate, 73 Cal. App. 2d 588, 166 P. 2d 870 (1946); Linthicum v.
Bagby, 131 Md. 644, 102 Adt. 997 (1917); Equitable Trust Co. v. Lyons, 72 Misc.
49, 129 N.Y. Supp. 79 (1911) See BRITrON, BILLS AND NOTES 329, 330 (1943).
'See supra p. 150.
The use of the term "prima facie authority" by the codifiers tends to darify the
type of authority granted since the term "implied authority" varies in scope and
meaning.
The person in possession to whom prima facie authority is granted by § 14 is
qualified by § 15 to one who gained possession of the instrument only after an ini-
tial delivery of the incomplete instrument by the signer. Thus, anyone, such as a
thief or finder, or person purchasing from them, in possession of an undelivered
incomplete instrument cannot recover upon the instrument from a signer who signed
before delivery.
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mene.'3 The second sentence of the section should allow a person to write
a complete instrument above a signature of the signer if the signer intended
that a negotiable instrument be written above it.'4
The third sentence of Section 14 provides:
In order, however, that any such instrument when completed may be
enforced against any person who became a party thereto prior to its com-
pletion, it must be filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given
and within a reasonable time.
The presumption that acts of completion were done in accordance with
the authority given by the signer will remain until rebutted. 5 After the
holder puts the completed instrument in evidence and rests Is prima facie
case, the signer has the burden of going forward?6
A breach of either express or implied authority in completing an in-
strument bars recovery upon it against all parties prior to completion by
any person who is not a holder in due course.' 7 Evidence of express in-
structions by the signer which were violated or of facts giving rise to an
implied authority which was exceeded when an instrument was completed,
rebuts the presumption of correct completion.' Implied authority may
be established, for example, by evidence of prior dealings or custom.' 9
13White v. White, 39 Cal. App. 2d 57, 102 P.2d 432 (1940) (date); Canon v.
Grigsby, 116 IMI. 151, 5 N.E. 362 (1886) (place of payment); Marion Say. Bank
v. Leahy, 200 Iowa 220, 204 N.W 456 (1925) (payee); Windahl v. Vanderwilt,
200 Iowa 816, 203 N.W 252 (1925) (amount); Clark v. Layman, 144 Kan. 711,
62 P. 2d 897 (1936) (date); Simpson v. First Nat. Bank, 94 Ore. 147, 185 Pac.
913 (1919) (payee); see Linthicum v. Bagby, 131 Md. 644, 648, 102 Ad. 997, 998
(1917) (authority under § 14 extends to every incomplete feature).
The words "material parucular" in § 14 are not intended to include only those
particulars necessary to the creation of a negotiable instrument. Johnston v. Hoover,
139 Iowa 143, 117 N.W 277 (1908).
"Such a construction is in accord with the rule of the law merchant that where a
man signs his name on a blank piece of paper for the purpose of giving a letter of
credit, his signature authorizes the holder to write a complete instrument above the
signature. Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 140 (1809); Herbert v. Huie,
1 Ala. 18 (1840); see Ayres v. Harnes, 1 Ohio 368, 372 (1824) (stating that this
same rule applied to a simple promissory note, but holding that it did not apply to a
bond under seal).
1 Windahl v. Vanderwilt, 200 Iowa 816, 203 N.W 252 (1925); Brown v. Thomas,
120 Va. 763, 92 S.E. 977 (1917).
"In re Gillett's Estate, 73 Cal. App 2d 588, 166 P. 2d 870 (1946); Windahl v.
Vanderwilt, 200 Iowa 816, 203 N.W 252 (1925); Brown v. Thomas, 120 Va.
763, 92 S.E. 977 (1917).
17Hartngton Nat Bank v. Breslin, 88 Neb. 47, 128 N.W 659 (1910); Cinema
Circuit Corp. v. Merrill Amusement Corp., 121 N.J.L. 216, 2 A.2d 43 (1938)
(authority to fill blanks was revoked before filling); Burke v. Jenkins, 128 Ohio
St. 86, 190 N.E. 238 (1934).
"Schuster v. Bowen, 97 Cal. App.2d 803, 218 P.2d 839 (1950); Tremont Trust
Co. v. Noyes, 246 Mass. 197, 141 N.E. 93 (1923); Equitable Trust Co. of New
York v. Lyons, 72 Misc. 49, 129 N.Y. Supp. 79 (1911).
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The problem has frequently arisen whether a sum placed by the signer
in the margin of an instrumen 0 containing a blank for the amount can
limit the amount which the holder can effectively fill in. Since marginal
data stating the amount can be a form of express authority on the face of the
instrument, the holder is put upon inquiry as to whether there may be
limited authority to fill up the blank for the amount.21 No case has been
found where the holder has taken an instrument after completion which
contained a sum in the margin differing from that found in the body, and
the holder had no knowledge of who placed the data on the instrument
22
In order to rebut the presumption of correct completion, courts have
held that the defendant-signer must bear the "burden of proof" in the sense
of "risk of non-persuasion" that completion was not done in accordance
with the authority given.21 Testimony that the instrument was not com-
pleted in accordance with authority given is properly admissible under a
general denial since it tends to disprove the holder's contention that he holds
an obligation from the signer.24 The question whether the instrument was
completed in an unauthorized manner is normally a question of fact for
the jury.25
Once the presumption of correct completion is rebutted, the holder
cannot recover upon the instrument unless he offers further evidence
*'Schuster v. Bowen, 97 Cal. App.2d 803, 218 P.2d 839 (1950) (evidence of prior
dealings held admissible to show limited authority to fill a blank for the amount
in a check)
'Normally, the sum in the margin consists of figures placed in the upper left part
of the paper, immediately above the wording of the instrument.
'Hall v. Bank of Commonwealth, 35 Ky. 179, 5 Dana 258 (1837); Henderson v.
Bondurant, 39 Mo. 369 (1867); Schryver v. Hawkes, 22 Ohio St 308 (1872);
Kimball v. Costa, 76 Vt. 289, 56 At. 1009 (1904); Chestnut v. Chestnut, 104 Va.
539, 52 S.E. 348 (1905).
" It seems that the holder should be put upon inquiry by the dissimilarity of the
two sums - especially since a presumption exists that memoranda on an instrument
were placed there contemporaneously with the execution of the instrument. Na-
tional Bank v. Feeney, 12 S.D. 156, 80 N.W 186 (1899); Fletcher v. Blodgett,
16 Vt 26 (1844).
'In re Gillett's Estate, 73 Cal. App.2d 588, 166 P. 2d 870 (1946); Windahl v.
Vanderwilt, 200 Iowa 816, 203 N.W 252 (1925); Madden v. Gaston, 137 App.
Div. 294, 121 N.Y. Supp. 951 (1910). The holding that the defendant-signer has
the burden of proving that completion was done in excess of authority seems incon-
sistent since, in the normal case, a party need only produce some countervailing evi-
dence in order to overcome a presumption - he need not rebut the presumption
by a preponderance of the evidence. Heinemann v. Heard, 62 N.Y. 448 (1875);
Ginn v. Dolan, 81 Ohio St. 121, 90 N.E. 141 (1909); Klunk v. Hocking Valley
R. Co. 74 Ohio St. 125, 77 N.E. 752 (1906) See the excellent discussion of bur-
den of proof in First Nat. Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 118-120, 216 Pac. 691, 693-
694 (1923)
'
4Bloom v. Horwitz, 100 Misc. 687, 166 N.Y. Supp. 786 (1917)
'Roberts v. Rider, 255 Ky. 266, 73 S.W 2d 17 (1934); McComsey v. McGowan,
325 Pa. 484, 190 Ad. 884 (1937).
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either that blanks actually were filled " strictly in accordance with the
authority given "2 or that the signer ratified an unauthorized act of
completion. 27
In order that an instrument containing blanks may be enforced," it
must be filled up within a reasonable time ," in the absence of proof
of an express tune limitation.2 8 Whether the blanks were filled within a
reasonable time is a question of fact in each particular case .2-  The standards
set forth in Section 19330 for determining a reasonable time should be
applied to this problem.
Because the first part of Section 14 raises a presumption that the in-
strument was properly completed, it would seem that a presumption that
the blanks were filled within a reasonable time should also existarl Yet
at least one court has held that there is no such presumption.82
The death of the signer raises a question as to the right of the surviving
holder to fill in the incomplete instrument. Most courts agree that the
authority to fill blanks is coupled with an interest and therefore is not re-
voked by the signer's death22  However, there is authority that when the
incomplete instrument is delivered as a gift, the blanks must be filled before
the donor's death, which acts as a revocation.34
Under the rules of the law merchant, if a maker or drawer entrusted a
note or bill complete except for the name of the payee to an agent with
"Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Lyons, 72 Misc. 49, 129 N.Y. Supp. 79
(1911).
'Windahl v. Vanderwilt, 200 Iowa 816, 203 N.W 252 (1925); First Nat. Bank
of Marengo v. Athey, 188 Iowa 330, 174 N.W 347 (1919).
-"NEGOTIABLE INsTrRmENTs LAW, § 14 (third sentence).
"White v. White, 39 Cal. App.2d 57, 102 P.2d 432 (1940); Brown v. Thomas,
120 Va. 763, 92 S.E. 977 (1917). The following cases give examples of reason-
able periods: White v. White, 39 Cal. App.2d 57, 102 P.2d 432 (1940) (14
years); Finley v. Rose, 189 Ky. 359, 224 S.W 1059 (1920) (17 years); In re
Ferrara, 109 N. J. Eq. 49, 156 Ad. 265 (1931) (14 months); Brown v. Thomas,
120 Va. 763, 92 S.E. 977 (1917) (2 years). The following cases give examples
of unreasonable periods: Griffin v. Muffins, 21 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. App. 1929)
(6% months); Columbia River Door Co. v. Timms, 127 Ore. 227, 271 Pac. 607
(1928) (14 months); Paschke v. Stoller, 189 Wis. 348, 207 N.W 704 (1926)
(1 year).
"In determining what is a 'reasonable time' or an 'unreasonable time,' regard is
to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business (if any)
with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular case."
"See BRIrON, BILLs AND*NOTES 334 (1943).
"
2Madden v. Gaston, 137 App. Div. 294, 121 N.Y. Supp. 951 (1910); see Brown
v. Thomas, 120 Va. 763, 769, 92 S.E. 977, 978 (1917).
' Barnes' Executors v. Reynolds, 5 Miss. 114 (1839); 1I re Ferrara, 109 N. J. Eq.
49, 156 Ad. 265 (1931); Brown v. Thomas, 120 Va. 763, 92 S.E. 977 (1917); see
Hatch v. Searles, 2 Sm. & G. 147, 65 Eng. Rep. 342, 345 (1854).
"In re Eshenbaugh's Estate, 114 Pa. Super. 341, 174 Ad. 809 (1934).
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instructions to take it to A, and if, instead of that, the agent delivered it to
B, then B had authority implied at law to insert his name as payee if he
took the instrument without actual notice of the limitation on the agenes
authority.3
5
Tis rule has been changed by Section 14, so that B would now have to
fill up the blank for the payee's name " . strictly in accordance with the
authority given " by the signer, before he or his transferee who is not a
holder in due course could enforce the instrument.5 8
Section 14 also changed the common law rule in the Umted States con-
cerning the acquiring of an instrument issued with any other type of blank.37
Under Section 14, a person who takes an instrument with blanks or even
with knowledge that it originally contained blanks is put upon inquiry as to
the extent of the authority given to fill the blanks.38 It appears that the
only safe method by which the holder can ascertain authority is to com-
municate with the signer.
The holder who takes an instrument containing blanks is not only put
upon inquiry as to the authority given to complete the instrument, but he is
also charged with notice of all other equities and defenses which could
have been asserted against his transferor3 5
In an action upon an instrument which was originally delivered in in-
complete form, a holder in due course recovers free from a defense of the
signer that blanks were filled in violation of authority.40 This rule is found
in the last sentence of Section 14, which provides:
But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated to a holder
in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his hands, and he
may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance with the
authority given and within a reasonable time.
'SMoody v. Threlkeld, 13 Ga. 55 (1853); Sittg v. Birkestack, 38 Md. 158 (1873);
Thompson v. Rathbun, 18 Ore. 202, 22 Pac. 837 (1889); Close v. Fields, 2 Texas
232 (1847).
"
6 Tower v. Stanley, 220 Mass. 429, 107 N.E. 1010 (1915); Simpson v. First Nat.
Bank, 94 Ore. 147, 185 Pac. 913 (1919); Brown v. Thomas, 120 Va. 763, 92 S.E.
977 (1917)
For the common law, see Angle v. North-western Mutual Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S.
330 (1875); Thompson v. Bank of Chatsworth, 30 Ga. App. 443, 118 S.E. 470
(1923); Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio St. 530 (1855).3
'Hannen v. People's State Bank, 195 Ky. 58, 241 S.W 355 (1922); Bronson v.
Stetson, 252 Mich. 6, 232 N.W 741 (1930); Maurer v. Hahn, 104 N.J.L. 254, 140
Ad. 273 (1928), aff'd. 105 N.J.L. 494, 145 Ad. 316 (1929); Burke v. Jenkins,
128 Ohio St. 86, 190 N.E. 238 (1934) (no recovery where agent of payee took
delivery of note and agent filled in blank with payee's name); Simpson v. First Nat.
Bank, 94 Ore. 147, 185 Pac. 913 (1919); Cache Valley Comm'n. Co. v. Genter
Sales Co., 63 Utah 574, 228 Pac. 203 (1924)
'Tower v. Stanley, 220 Mass. 429, 107 N.E. 1010 (1915); Moore v. Vaughn, 167
Miss. 758, 150 So. 372 (1933); Columbia River Door Co. v. Timms, 127 Ore. 227,
271 Pac. 607 (1928)
" Johnston v. Hoover, 139 Iowa 143, 117 N.W 277 (1908); State Bank v. Harford,
EDecember
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A holder of an instrument which originally contained blanks who takes
either before or contemporaneously with the act of completion cannot
qualify as a holder in due course because Section 14 requires that the holder
in due course take after completion. This proposition is affirmed in Sec-
tion 52, which declares: "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken
the instrument under the following condition: (1) that it is complete
and regular upon its face " Further, even the knowledge that blanks
existed at the time the instrument was originally delivered gives a holder
constructive notce of the signer's instructions and precludes him from
being a holder in due course.41
It should be noted that the last sentence of Section 14 refers only to one
to whom the instrument has been negotiated as a holder in due course. The
problem of whether one who does not receive an instrument, originally
delivered with blanks, through a negotiation can recover upon the instru-
ment as a holder in due course has caused some controversy.
In the leading case of Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, 2 the Iowa Supreme
Court held that the payee of a note, who took it from one to whom it was
entrusted by the makers for the purpose of delivery to the payee to ex-
tinguish a debt of the makers, became the holder of the note through issu-
ance but not through a negotiauon; 43 therefore, the payee could not qualify
and recover as a holder in due course." An opposite view was expressed
in the similar case of Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton45 m which it was held
that a payee who purchased the instrument in complete form was a person
to whom the instrument was negotiated and he may qualify as a holder in
due course 40 The real conflict between the two cases seems to rest upon
the interpretation of the term "negoation '47  The Iowa court limited
116 Kan. 262, 226 Pac. 750 (1924); Exchange Bank v. Robinson, 185 Mo. App.
582, 172 S.W 628 (1915); Rutherford Nat. Bank v. Nichols, 102 N.Y.S.2d 658
(Sup. Ct. 1951); Battle v. Patsy Auto Sales, 89 Ohio App. 231 (1951) (declara-
tory judgment).
"Hannen v. People's State Bank, 195 Ky. 58, 241 S.W 355 (1922); Dumbrow v.
Gelb, 72 Misc. 400, 130 N.Y.Supp. 182 (1911). Contra: First Discount Corp. v.
Hatcher Auto Sales, 156 Ohio St. 191 (1951).
135 Iowa 350, 112 N.W 807 (1907).
The court indicated that if § 14 would provide for issuance to a holder in due
course as well as negotiation, then the payee could have recovered.
"The holding rested largely on the authority of Herdman v. Wheeler, 1 K.B. 361
(1902), which was a similar case decided under § 20 of the Bills of Exchange Act,
which is equivalent to § 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
' 217 Mass. 462, 105 NYE. 605 (1914).
" The court reached its decision by a chain of reasoning which it felt was in con-
formity with the terms of the Negotiable Instruments aw and the law merchant.
No distinction was drawn in the case between the terms "issue" and "negotiation."
"
TNEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 30 provides: "An instrument is negotiated
when it is transferred from one person to another in such a manner as to constitute
1951]
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the term to the transfer of an instrument from one holder to another while
the Massachusetts court construed the term broadly by holding that an
instrument is negotiated when any person, for value, becomes its owner.48
In the same year that the Vander Ploeg case was decided, the English
Court of Appeal held on a similar set of facts that the payee could recover
as a holder in due course.4 ) The court dismissed the negotiation issue by
stating that the case need not be determined by reference to the section of
the Bills of Exchange Act which is substantially the same as Section 14 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law. Instead it decided the case on the basis
of estoppel at common law. The defendant-maker was estopped from
setting up the defense that the blank left for the amount was filled in excess
of authority.
Both the "Iowa Rule" established in the Vander Ploeg case and the
"Massachusetts Rule" established in the Tiltonz case have been followed by
American courts.50 At the same time, a number of American cases have
been decided in accordance with the English view.5 ' The result reached
by the cases following the English view seems the proper one, since the
question of whether a holder who innocently takes a completed instrment,
which originally contained blanks, not through a negotiation, may recover
as a holder in due course is not covered by the Negotiable Instruments Law
except to the extent that it is covered by Section 196, which makes the law
merchant applicable "In any case not provided for in this act";52 and under
the law merchant such a holder may recover as if he were a holder in due
course.
53
There is a split of authority on whether recovery is allowed by one who
is not a holder in due course upon an instrument where a blank for the
amount was filled in excess of authority. The better-reasoned cases follow
the transferee the holder thereof. If payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery;
if payable to order it is negotiated by the endorsement of the holder completed by
delivery."
"From the second part of § 30 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, supra note 46,
it would seem that the Iowa court's construction of "negotiation" is correct since the
section requires an endorsement of the holder to negotiate an order instrument. The
Massachusetts court "reasoned" that § 30 does not necessarily include the only means
by which an order instrument can be negotiated. See J. I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co. v. Howth, 116 Texas 434, 439-440, 293 S.W 800, 801-802 (1927) for a dis-
cussion of the two opposing views.
"Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke, 1 K.B. 794 (1907) The decision in this case seems to
have overruled Herdman v. Wheeler, 1 K.B. 261 (1902), supra note 43, even
though the court said there was a distinction between the two cases.
" Cases following the "Iowa Rule" are: Devoy & Khun Coal & Coke Co. v. Huttg,
174 Iowa 357, 156 N.W 412 (1916); Southern Nat. Life Realty Corp. v. People's
Bank, 178 Ky. 80, 198 S.W 543 (1917); Bronson v. Stetson, 252 Mich. 6, 232
N.W 741 (1930); J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Howth, 116 Texas 434, 293
S.W 800 (1927) Cases following the "Massachusetts Rule" are: Maurer v. Hahn,
104 N.J.L. 254, 140 Ad. 273 (1928), aff'd. 105 N. J. L 494, 145 Ad. 316
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the rule that filling in an unauthorized amount invalidates the entire in-
strument, as does any unauthorized act of completion." This rule seems
consistent with the wording in Section 14 that, " . in order, however, that
such instrument when completed may be enforced it must be filled up
strictly in accordance with the authority given " Some cases, however,
have allowed recovery on an instrument completed for an excessive amount
to the extent of the amount authorizedY5
CONCLUSIONS
The Negotiable Instruments Law in regard to incomplete instrments
may be summarized thus: The holder has prima facie authority to fill any
blanks in an instrument which was delivered by the signer, or to write a
complete instrument over a signature; but in order for him or one suc-
ceeding solely to his rights to recover on the completed instrument, the
completion must be made within a reasonable time and in accordance with
the authority expressly or impliedly given by the signer. One who can
qualify as a holder in due course will be protected when he takes the in-
strument, regardless of the equites between prior parties.
It appears that the maker or drawer of an incomplete instrument bene-
fitted from the enactment of Section 14. While the law merchant pro-
tected the signer from holders with actual notice that the authority he gave
was exceeded, the Negotiable Instruments Law, in addition, protects the
signer from those who take without notice and yet cannot qualify as holders
in due course.
Financial institutions and individuals must keep a constant guard when
deciding whether to purchase an instrument (usually a note) in which the
prospective purchaser is already named as payee from a third person repre-
(1929); American Nat. Bank v. Kerley, 109 Ore.155, 220 Pac. 116 (1923);
Johnston v. Knipe, 260 Pa. 504, 105 At. 705 (1918).
"Roberts v. Rider, 255 Ky. 266, 73 S.W 2d 17 (1934); Bank of Commerce &
Savings v. Randell, 107 Neb. 332, 186 N.W 70 (1921); Ladd & Tilton Bank v.
Small, 126 Wash. 8, 216 Pac. 862 (1923).
2
'In any case not provided for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall
govern."
'Moody v. Threlkeld, 13 Ga. 55 (1853); Young v. Ward, 21 Ill. 223 (1859);
Thompson v. Rathbun, 18 Ore. 202, 22 Pac. 837 (1889); Johnson Harvester Co. v.
McLean, 57 Wis. 258, 15 N.W 177 (1883); Russel v. Langstaffe, 2 Dougl. 514,
99 Eng. Rep. 328 (1780). See Hemng, The Uniform Negotible Instruments Law.
Is It Producing Uniformity and Certainty in the Law Merchant? 59 U. OF PA. L.
Ruqv. 471, 481 (1911).
"Stout v. Eastern Rock Island Plow Co. 202 Ind. 517, 176 N.E. 844 (1931);
Ogden v. Pope, 44 N.Y.S.R. 646, 18 N.Y. Supp. 140 (1892). See Note, 75 A.L.R.
1390 (1931).
'Hannen v. People's State Bank, 195 Ky. 58, 241 S.W 355 (1922); Rodgers v.
Baker, 136 App. Div. 851, 122 N.Y. Supp. 91 (1910). See Note, 75 A.LR.
1390 (1931).
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